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Book Review
TAKING SHARI' A SERIOUSLY
THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE.
Noah Feldman.' Princeton University Press. 2008. Pp. 189.
Cloth. $22.95.
Asifa Quraish/

Paradigm shifts are not easy. Noah Feldman is taking on a
big one in his latest book, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State,
where he sets out to re-conceptualize shari'a in the American
mind as an Islamic rule of law. This is a valuable contribution to
a discourse in which Muslim desires for shari'a are often
dismissed as naive steps backwards into theocracy, or worse,
condemned as demands for gruesome and misogynistic
punishment or even terrorism. Against these assumptions,
Feldman confidently insists-quite correctly, in my opinionthat classical Islamic legal and political institutions were
organized in a "constitutional" structure that operated as a
"separation of powers" between the temporal rulers and the
religious legal scholars. In these systems, Feldman says, because
God's law (shari'a) was always supreme, it was respect for law
that held rulers in check, their authority operating in a complex
(although unwritten) shared power arrangement with the
scholars who interpreted shari'a for society. Feldman believes
that an appreciation of the primary feature of these traditional
Islamic states'-that the rule of God's law stood above the rule
of individual men- will help explain why the idea of an Islamic

1. Professor of Law. Harvard University.
2. Assistant Professor of Law. Universiiv of Wisconsin.
3. Feldman's use of contemporary l~gal-political terms like .. constitutional. ..
.. separation of powers ... and even .. state .. strikes me at times as awkwardly anachronistic.
but I see its usefulness in the ready associations these terms have in his readers· minds.
Nevertheless. I remain concern~d that these terms. without careful caveats and
explanations. may ultimately detract from the overall persuasiveness of his presentation.
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state is so popular today, especially in regions where corrupt
dictators are the norm. He imagines ways a new Islamic state
could recapture some of the key features of this old order.
suggesting models for modern Islamic constitutionalism. His
book ends with the bold recommendation that a United States
that is committed to rule of law around the world should support
new Islamic legal and constitutional institutions when they make
their play for legitimacy on the basis of promising justice and the
rule of law via shari'a (p. 150).
It is obvious what sorts of criticisms Feldman's portrayal
invites. Any description of a rule of law in which God's Law is
supreme sounds to most Americans like a theocracy.~ And if
Islamic constitutionalism means a shari'a-based rule of law in
which religious law could trump democratic legislation. it is to be
expected that Americans committed to secular democracy would
oppose any form of Islamic constitutionalism. modern or
otherwise. Moreover, looking around the world at Islamic states
today, many find that the sorts of laws promoted as shari'amandated conflict with global civil and human rights norms. If it
is believed that Islamic law demands. for example, that an
Islamic state should stone adulterers and give men more divorce
rights than women, then no version of a shari'a-inspired
separation of powers will alleviat~ the problems many have with
the substance of Islamic law itself.'
These are powerful arguments. only partially answered in
Feldman's book. Where he does not answer them directly,
appropriate conclusions could be extrapolated by the reader.
but. because the paradigm shift Feldman attempts is so great.
many of his readers are not likely to do so, leaving his ultimate
conclusions vulnerable. Below. I offer a critique of Feldman's
4. See. e.g.. Leon Wieseltier. Theologico-PoliTicus. THE NEW REPUBLIC. April 9.
2008. at 48 (describing Feldman's argument as a ··shilling for a soft theocracy").
5. These arguments are primary themes in critiques by people like Haider
Hamoudi and Said Arjomand. See Haider Ala Hamoudi. OrienTa/ism and "The Fall and
Rise of The Islamic SraTe" 17 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 200827). a·vai/able aT http://ssrn.com/abstract=l266386 (citing. among other examples. "the
case of the Sudan. yet another devastating example of the entire disrespect of an Islamist
party. the National Islamic Front ('NIF') for the rule of law"): Posting of Said Amir
Arjomand to The Immanent Frame. http:!/blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/03/28/why-shariah/
(Mar. 28. 2008) (critiquing Feldman's New York Times Magazine article entitled "Why
Shariah~" which previews many arguments in The Rise and Fall of The !slamic SraTe)
("The legal evidence we have from the countries in which it has been tried suggests that
the demands for the implementation of the Shariah primarily means that of its penal
code (hudud) with severe punishments for adultery. theft and blasphemy which gravely
disadvantage the women. the poor and the religiously deviant. and has no constitutional
component.").
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book that focuses on how his thesis could be strengthened by
more direct engagement with these important contemporary
concerns. First, I believe that Feldman's arguments could be
framed with clearer language in order to distinguish the various
types of law implicated in his presentation. In Part I below, I
explain why, without more careful delineation of the differences
between shari'a and fiqh, and fiqh and siyasa, some very
important normative distinctions inherent to the field of Islamic
law can be lost. Then, in Part II below, I comment on the
modern shari'a constitutional models imagined by Feldman,
pointing out the confusion that can result from his amalgamation
of fiqh and siyasa lawmaking. I explain why, when translated
into global questions about modern Islamic constitutionalism,
this merging of concepts can cause unnecessary distortions and
concerns about the viability of shari'a as the rule of law principle
that Feldman has so skillfully set out to articulate.
I. LANGUAGE CHOICE: DISTINGUISHING SHARI'A,

FIQH AND SlYASA
Language is crucial when writing in a field unfamiliar to a
large part of one's audience. For Feldman's current work, this is
especially true of the word "shari'a," and he realizes this. As he
put it in a recent New York Times Magazine article, "[ o ]ne
reason for the divergence between Western and Muslim views of
Shariah is that we are not all using the word to mean the same
thing. Although it is commonplace to use the word 'Shariah' and
the phrase 'Islamic law' interchangeably, this prosaic English
translation does not capture the full set of associations that the
term "Shariah' conjures for the believer." 6 In The Fall and Rise,
Feldman does a good job of appropriately broadening the
meaning of shari'a beyond its most narrow translations, but his
word usage is nevertheless not always consistent and at times can
be confusing. Feldman uses shari'a to refer not only to broad
concepts of justice, like the "rule of law." and even "law" itself in
the most abstract sense,' but also to overall structures of
government' and then to "Islamic law" as the body of doctrinal
rules articulated by religious legal scholars. 9
6. Noah Feldman. Whl' Shariah?. NEW YORK TI\!ES MAGAZINE. March 16. 2008.
at 46. 48.
·
7. See, e.g.. p. 6 ("The Islamic state is preeminently a shari'a state. defined by its
commitment to a vision of legal order. ... The system was justified by Jaw. and the
system administered basic government through Jaw.").
8. See. e.g.. p. 21 ('''Islam· means the shari'a. understood as an all-encompassing
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The problem with using the same word (shari'a) for both
religious legal doctrine and big rule-of-law concepts is that these
two ideas contradict each other in many readers' minds. Many
Americans already identify shari'a with things like stoning, hand
amputation and unequal rights for women. Given this backdrop,
an assertion that shari'a is the "rule of law" for Muslims risks
entrenching the idea that Muslims have a warped sense of justice
that cannot be reconciled with contemporary international
norms. Noah Feldman himself does not subscribe to this notion,
but without more careful use of terms and conceptual categories.
his book might be misconstrued to support it. By providing more
information about Islamic law at a theoretical as well as practical
level. Feldman could avoid much of this confusion, and
moreover. place his ruler-scholar "separation of powers" thesis
into greater context.
Specifically. Feldman's book could better emphasize the
difference between the terms "shari'a" and "fiqh." Although
both can be translated as "Islamic law." the two words portray
very different concepts. Shari'a literally means "way" or "road.''
and as a legal term, refers to "God's Law.'' a divine exhortation
to all Muslims about the ideal way to behave in this world.
Because the two scriptural sources of information about this
road (the Quran. and the life example of the Prophet
Mohammed) do not answer every possible life and legal
question. Muslim scholars engaged (and continue to engage) in
legal interpretation of those sources to come up with detailed
rules on a wide range of legal topics, including those that
American lawyers would put in categories like torts. contracts,
property. family and criminal law. These rules are called "fiqh,"
which literally means "understanding."
The use of the term "fiqh" and not "shari'a'' for these
doctrinal rules of Islamic law is epistemologically significant. It
reflects the classical Muslim scholars' awareness that
interpretation of divine texts is an unavoidably human, and
therefore fallible. effort. Moreover. the fallibility of fiqh rules
had several significant consequences for the evolution of Islamic

structure that precisely orders social relations and facilitates economic justice .... [T]o
understand the shari'a as a constitutional ground rule is to invoke a rich and complex
historv of constitutional law and theorv that stretches back centuries.").
9. See. e.g.. p. 115 ("The negative political side of the invocation of the shari'a is
that. taken as a set of substantive rules. the classical Islamic law is decidedly
nonrnodern."). p. 116 (''the non-modern features of the shari'a that are most salient
include harsh corporal punishment. .. ).
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law and government. First. because fiqh scholars recognized that
their extrapolations of legal rules were always at best only
probable (rather than certain) articulations of God's Law
(shari'a), every fiqh scholar's conclusions (as long as they were
the product of sincere interpretive effort) had equal legitimacy
and authority for Muslims who sought to live by shari'a. Islamic
law as a whole, therefore, is not one legal code but rather a
pluralism of legal schools, each with distinct interpretive
methodologies and corresponding bodies of legal doctrine.
The fallible and pluralistic nature of the fiqh also
contributed to a bifurcation of legal authority in classical Muslim
societies-a bifurcation that is important to Feldman's
"separation of powers" thesis. Fiqh scholars were generally
reluctant to have the fiqh doctrine of one school forced upon the
whole population, and instead advocated institutional
mechanisms that allowed Muslims to live according to the school
of their choice. At the same time. rulers of Muslim lands sought
to establish uniform rules to govern society, especially in areas
like taxes. marketplace standards, criminal investigation and
prosecution, and military service. These ruler-made lawssiyasa-were quite different in nature and effect than the fiqh.
Fiqh was the product of jurisprudential analyses of divine texts
by individual religious scholars whose work in this regard did not
depend upon any official position or appointment. Siyasa, on the
other hand, was created not by scholars parsing divine texts, but
by those holding physical power, following their own
philosophies of government and ideas about how best to
maintain public order. From a shari'a perspective, rulers had
legitimate authority to do this because maintenance of public
order and safety is part of the Qur'anic vision of a good ruler. 10
The two realms of legal authority, fiqh and siyasa-scholars and
rulers- operated in many different institutional forms
throughout Muslim history, but the interdependence of these
powers was a consistent feature of the rule of law of classical
shari'a- based societies. 11
10. Whether the rulers actually did act for the public good is another question. and
was the source of much discussion and frustration for manv scholars. Nevertheless. as
long as the ruler allowed a basic minimal level of religious· practice (i.e. did not force
Muslims to sin). the classical jurists writing political theory generally gave great latitude
to the ruler's power. and the rulers in turn generally left the articulation of the fiqh to the
f1qh scholars.) For a brief description of the scholars· attitudes on this point. see
Mohammad H. Fadel. The True, the Good, and the Reasonable: The Theological and
Ethical Roots of Puh/ic Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CA:o-;. J.L. & JCRIS. 5 (2008).
11. For a look at how these two realms intersected on the ground in everyday
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When Noah Feldman describes the ··constitutional"
structure of the traditional "Islamic state" as a separation of
powers between rulers and scholars, he essentially describes the
fiqh and siyasa realms. but without using these particular terms.
He does use the word fiqh to refer to scholar-created Islamic
legal doctrine. but the term appears only once in the entire
12
book. And instead of siyasa, he uses the phrase ''administrative
13
regulations," which has the effect of downplaying its status as
"law," giving the impression that ruler siyasa merely filled
administrative gaps in a .fiqh-dominated legal universe. This can
be misleading. Siyasa was powerful law; it was the legal arm of
caliphs, sultans and kings, giving them a way to directly impact
people's lives in a wide range of areas from crime to taxes. It is
important to recognize the real lawmaking aspect of the siyasa
power of Muslim rulers because it gives it a status parallel to that
of the fiqh authority of the scholars and thereby further
elucidates the ''checking and balancing'' relationship between
14
them.
Using a fiqh-siyasa template to explain the classical Muslim
"separation of powers" also helps to show why a shari'a-based
system does not necessitate a theocracy. The classical fiqh-siyasa
division of legal and political authority was, quite simply, never a
society. see Kristen Stilt's study of the muhtasib in Mamluk Egypt. Kristen Stilt. Price
Setting and Harding in Mamluk Egypt. in THE LAW APPLIED: COI\TEXTUALIZING THE
ISLA\1IC SHARI'A 57 (Peri Berman. eta!. eds .. 2008).
12. Seep. 42 (denoting the "Islamic legal doctrine" applied by judges).
13. See, e.g.. p. 42. (". . . the Islamic constitutional order always included
administrative regulations with the force of law that were issued by the ruler or his
deputies"). p. 46 ("It . . . made sense for [the ruler] to use his power to issue
administrative regulations to enhance his wealth or to punish those who opposed him.").
p. 50 ("Because the shari'a as interpreted by the scholars ultimately authorized the ruler
to issue administrative regulations ... "). p. 61 ("In the classical Sunni constitutional
balance. the shari'a existed alongside a body of administrative regulations that governed
manv matters in the realms of taxation and criminal law.").
i4. Further confusion on the nature of ruler siyasa results from Feldman's using the
word "shari'a" where fiqh would be more appropriate. For example. his descriptions that
shari'a existed "alongside" ruler administrative regulations (p. 61) seems to directly
contradict the idea that these regulations had to comply with shari'a. Seep. 64 (''Under
the classical Islamic constitution. the condition for the administrative regulations was that
the shari'a authorized the ruler to issue these regulations."). Another example of the
confusion of using shari'a where fiqh would make more sense. is the following statement:
"In each situation where administrative regulations were issued and enforced. one could
say that the rules that applied to ordinary people in their daily lives were not the rules of
the shari'a itself' (p. 43). This prompts a useful commentary from Feldman on the
misplaced questioning of whether Islamic law is really "law" at all. But. despite the
helpful insights Feldman offers on this point. his discussion would benefit from more
carefully-crafted use of language. in which "fiqh" refers to discrete legal doctrine based
on scripture. "siyasa" is ruler-made temporal law. and "shari'a" is reserved for the
abstract concept of God's Law. of which the other two are both subordinate.
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theocratic distribution of power. Rulers and scholars occupied
separate realms in classical Muslim societies. Though there was
occasional cooperation and coordination between them, as a
norm, Muslim religious scholars did not hold temporal power.
and Muslim rulers did not articulate religious law. Even taking
into account the political-theological differences between Sunni
15
and Shi'a doctrines about ideal government, for the bulk of
Muslim history neither Sunni nor Shi'a fiqh scholars sought
16
control of the political realm of the rulers. And Muslim rulers
made siyasa law not by jurisprudential analysis of divine texts (as
the fiqh was), but from their own determinations of governing
needs. 17 In short, the early indeterminacy and bifurcation of the
15. Classical shi'i legal and political theory centers the authority of decision-making
in the infallibility of a divinely-inspired Imam descended from the Prophet. From this. it
follows that the ruler should be not only a jurist but also the divinely-appointed Imam of
that age. See ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA. THE JUST RULER IN SH!"ITE ISLAM: THE
COMPREHENSIVE ACTHORITY OF THE JuRIST IN IMAMITE JURISPRUDENCE (1988). In
Shi'i legal theory. God is the fountainhead of the Law. and enforces this Law through the
Imam. who in turn is served by the mujtahids (scholars of ijtihad-qualifications) for the
interpretation of the law and by the heads of Shi'i temporal states. Shi'i mujtahids can
neither create law nor deduce new rules: theirs is merely the duty to interpret. referring
always to the imam's word. See A.A.A. Fyzee. Shi'i Legal Theories. in LAw IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 113. 121-27 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny eds .. 1955). But when
the last Imam went into occultation. this aspect of Shi'i law ceased to have much practical
impact. since traditional Shi'i theology held that jurists should not be in a position of
political power without the presence of the Imam. Until the Imam's return. Shi'a fiqh
scholars found themselves in much the same position as their Sunni counterparts: aware
of their own fallibility. yet nevertheless offering probable articulations of God's Law.
16. This. of course. changed with Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the vilayat-alfagih. which ultimately became the political doctrine of legitimacy of the Islamic
Republic of Iran after 1979. But it is important to remember that Khomeini's theory
itself represents a departure from the classical Shi'a position which maintained that
political power was for the Imam's return. See ISLA!\1 AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND
DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI (Hamid Algar trans .. 1981): CHIBL! MALLAT. THE
RENEWAL OF ISLA!\IIC LAW ( 1993 ): SACHEDINA. supra note 15.
17. Islamic legal and political history is thus different from Christian legal and
political history in this very significant way: not only was there no state "church" in
Islamic history. but there was no "church" at all for the state to co-opt (or to be co-opted
by). Most historians point to the Abbassid period called the "mihna" as the major-and
ultimately unsuccessful-attempt by Muslim rulers to dictate belief upon the people. See
1 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON. THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: THE CLASSICAL AGE OF
ISLAM. 285-319. 479-89 (1974 ). It was the resistance of the religious legal scholars (most
famously Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) to this attempt. upon pain of torture and even death. that
many see as the crucial moment that resulted in the lasting division of rights and
responsibilities of Muslim rulers and scholars: Rulers would maintain order in societv.
but they could not control belief: and religious legal scholars could articulate God's La~.
but they would not claim political power. This division of power reflects in many ways
the same motivation behind the separation of church and state in modern western
democracies (namely. avoiding the oppression that can result from state control of
belief). but. as Islam did not have a "church" to separate from the state. to protect
religious freedom Muslims separated types of law: Rulers would make siyasa (binding on
everyone. but not an articulation of God's Law). and religious scholars would make fiqh
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law in Muslim societies essentially demanded non-theocratic
government structures.
Noah Feldman knows this, of course, but some of the
descriptive language he uses in The Fall and Rise can at times
obscure this reality. For example, in describing the similarities of
Saudi Arabia to the classical system, he writes: "the king lacks
the authority to legislate-and it goes without saying that no
other legislative body exists either. Law, properly speaking, is
what the scholars, using the interpretive process, understand
God to have commanded" (p. 96). But of course this is not
exactly correct. Classical Muslim "kings" did have the authority
to "legislate": rulers made siyasa law all the time. What they did
not have authority to create was fiqh. However, this point is
obscured by Feldman's description of the classical Muslim legal
landscape, which presents fiqh as the dominant law, only
supplemented by rulers' "administrative regulations. " 18 In other
words, in this book, Feldman often equates "law" with the fiqh
enterprise of interpreting the shari'a (depicted as "God's
legislation"), and therefore all other rule making pales in
comparison. This is actually a common attitude for any study of
''Islamic law," defined as the doctrinal rules derived from Islamic
scripture. From this perspective, it makes sense to say that law is
"what the scholars ... understand God to have commanded," (p.
96) because this accurately describes what fiqh is.
But fiqh does not exhaust the field of what can be
considered "law" in Muslim history if one is looking at the larger
"balance of powers" picture that includes both rulers and
scholars-which is the perspective that Feldman presumably
wants us to take. From this view, siyasa rules are law tooperhaps even more properly so, from a modern secular
perspective. Without this awareness, readers might easily
interpret Feldman's fiqh-centric depiction as describing a
theocracy, with religious scholars in charge of all legislation. This
would be an inaccurate understanding of classical Muslim law
and government, because siyasa lawmaking was not dictated by
fiqh authorities any more than fiqh lawmaking was dictated by
siyasa authorities. The potential for confusion is heightened by
Feldman's dual use of the word shari'a to refer both to fiqh legal
doctrine as well an Islamic "rule of law." Only by keeping the
(an articulation of God's Law. but only with probable authority to be the truth. and
therefore not binding in and of itself).
18. See. e.g.. p. 115 ("the classical Islamic state with its qadis. muftis and
supplemental administrative regulations").
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two ideas distinct does the following sentence not sound like a
theocracy: "as a matter of principle. the complex of [ruler]
administrative regulations was subordinate to the authority of
the shari'a-and hence to the authority of the scholars who were
uniquely in control of its content" (pp. 43-44). This is true-and
should not be a threatening idea to American readers-if we
understand shari'a to mean the rule of law ideal of God's Law,
but not if it means the doctrinal fiqh. Moreover, attention to the
parallel legal powers of siyasa and fiqh also gives weight to
Feldman's "separation of powers" thesis. That is, it makes sense
that rulers and scholars would "check and balance" each other if
siyasa and fiqh occupy separate but interdependent and equally
powerful lawmaking realms. But if siyasa is unimportant and the
law of fiqh is the only law that exists, this leaves very little space
19
for negotiation of power between them.
II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: CONTEMPLATING A
SHARI'A-INSPIRED MODERN SEPARATION OF
POWERS
I agree with Noah Feldman's basic thesis that there was a
constitutional separation of powers between rulers and scholars
in pre-modern Muslim societies, and that this arrangement
constituted a shari'a rule of law. I especially support this
approach because I believe it is the most accessible way to
translate classical Islamic legal and political history into twentyfirst century concepts for western-educated audiences. I am also
very glad to see Feldman focus on the role played by the scholars
as a crucial element missing in failed attempts to establish the
rule of law in many Muslim-majority countries today. Many
observers do not fully appreciate the significance of the changed
role of fiqh scholars that occurred with the transformation of
legal institutions in Muslim societies from the classical to the
modern era. As Feldman puts it. "the displacement of the shari'a
and the decline of the scholarly class left behind no institutional
force capable of effectuating a replacement" (p. 90) of the
previous separation of powers, without which these societies
19. When the scholars publicly criticized a ruler's behavior on shari'a-based
grounds. the potential for social resistance and revolt was often enough for a ruler to
modify his actions. On the other hand. because the fiqh scholars commanded no armv.
rulers could in turn .. check .. the scholars. by simply choosing to ignore their protests an'd
address any potential social resistance with their considerable police power. In other
words. the complex and interdependent relationship between these two realms of legal
authority (fiqh and siyasa) is important to fully appreciating Feldman's rule of law thesis.
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were left subject to the whim of domineering executives. He
suggests that if new Islamic states "can find an institution to fill
the role traditionally played by the scholars, it has a reasonable
chance of establishing political justice, and through it, popular
legitimacy'' (p. 14). I find this suggestion very insightful and
forward-looking.
But I have concerns about Feldman's vision for what these
new institutions might look like. Islamists looking to develop
new institutions with "their own original and distinctive way of
giving real life to the ideals of Islamic law," he suggests, might
create an "Islamically oriented legislature, infused with the spirit
of a democratized shari'a" or "a court exercising Islamic judicial
review to shape and influence laws passed in its shadow" (p.
20
147).
That is. Feldman imagines that a shari'a-enacting
legislature or a shari'a-checking court could fill the void
previously occupied by the classical fiqh scholars. This proposal
answers the obvious need for a strong counter-balance to the
lopsided dominance of executive power in so many Muslimmajority countries today, but it draws a strained parallel between
the lawmaking power of fiqh scholars and that of modern
legislatures and judges. Let us take the "Islamically-oriented
legislature'' proposal first. Simply put, fiqh lawmaking is not
democratic lawmaking. Fiqh doctrine, recall, emerges from
jurisprudential parsing of Muslim scriptural sources, whereas
democratic legislation results from political debates and
pragmatic evaluations about what best serves the public good.
Moreover, from its inception fiqh lawmaking has existed
independent of the state: the authority of fiqh scholars comes
not from any state appointment but from the public reputation
established by their work. In fact, of the two types of law of the
classical Muslim world (fiqh and siyasa) it is actually siyasa
lawmaking-not fiqh lawmaking-that better parallels the work
that goes on in a democratic legislature. The work of fiqh
scholars is closer to the work of contemporary law professors
than legislators. In fact, it is likely that it was precisely the
"academic freedom" of the fiqh scholars that made their ability
to check the power of the rulers viable, because their articulation

20. Feldman is vague about the details of what this might look like. creating many
unanswered questions. For example. in his reference to "[a] democratically elected
legislature responsible for enacting provisions in accordance with-or at least not
repugnant to-the shari'a" (p. 124). he does not elaborate whether this means a
codification of established fiqh doctrine. or just legislating within the context of a respect
for an abstract divine rule of law. and avoiding legislation that forces Muslims to sin.
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of shari'a was not tainted by suspicion of government controL A
modern legislature cannot carry the same sort of "outside the
beltway" external check on government power because it is itself
part of the government.
Moreover. the concept of a shari'a-enacting legislature
prompts some peculiar questions. For example, Feldman asks:
"what must be done if the laws passed by the legislature ... do
not correspond to the 'true' content of Islamic law or values" (p.
121)? This is a strange question because (as Feldman alludes to
with quotation marks around the word "true") Muslims have
long accepted that it is impossible for humans in this lifetime to
know with any certainty the "true" content of God's law. As
described earlier, human fallibility and the corresponding
indeterminacy of truth were building blocks of Islamic
jurisprudence. This is, after all, why there are so many
established schools of fiqh doctrine-each operating on the
probability that it might have articulated the "true" shari'a, but
leaving open the possibility that it might be wrong. This brings us
to the inherent challenge in the proposal for a shari'a-checking
court. If the many schools of fiqh are all simultaneously
legitimate articulations of shari'a, then on what basis will the
court "check" legislation for shari'a compliance? Whatever
shari'a-based judgments are made by such a court will likely be
felt by the population as a state adopts one fiqh interpretation
over others and imposes it upon the entire population. This
merges fiqh and siyasa power in a new and dangerous way. If the
government has the power to enact its understanding of shari'a,
get approval of this interpretation from a shari'a court judgment,
and then use its police power to enforce it, those citizens who
disagree with the government's interpretation of Islam are left
with no avenues to opt-out, even if their interpretation is based
on a historically-established fiqh school of law. 21 Ironically, this
21. This state monopoly of law is quite different from the classical Muslim ruler·
scholar model in which rulers controlled the content of only siyasa law, and did not
influence fiqh articulations of shari'a. It is true that rulers enforced fiqh-based judgments,
by appointing judges to adjudicate cases litigating fiqh issues, but in doing so, they did
not articulate fiqh doctrine. The content of the fiqh by which these judges ruled was that
of the fiqh literature. not ruler decrees. Rulers never had authority to create or change
the content of fiqh scholars· articulations of God's Law. Their power over fiqh extended
only as far as the siyasa arm of enforcement could reach. Thus. classical Muslim legal
systems could accommodate pluralistic applications of fiqh within its populations because
of the inherent bifurcation of legal realms: the rulers would create and enforce only
siyasa laws-those that are based on evaluations of general public order, while the
scholars would articulate God's Law (shari'a) as best they could, but their resulting legal
doctrine (fiqh) was not binding in and of itself. Moreover. many rulers respected fiqh
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scenario is more theocratic than most classical Islamic systems
were. A crucial element is the modern nation-state context,
which operates not with a pluralistic, opt-in type of legal
authority, but rather one of uniformly enforced laws. Uniform
laws enforced on everyone works quite well for general public
order, siyasa-type, laws, but a government risks oppression and
theocracy when it enforces laws enacted on the basis of a
religious mandate. In other words, from both a classical Muslim
perspective as well as a modern secular one, it is not appropriate
for a legislature to be trying to "get shari'a right," nor for a court
to be declaring whether or not it did so.
A final note on the popular relevance of fiqh today. The
independent nature of fiqh scholarship continues today, despite
the widespread dismantling or reforming of classical Islamic
educational institutions during and after colonialism. The fiqh
scholars extant today still hold incredible prestige with large
numbers of Muslim populations, as Feldman himself has
eloquently illustrated in his description of Ayatollah Sistani's
role in influencing the state-building process in Iraq. 22 Pluralistic
though it is, and lacking the institutional infrastructure that it
once had, the loosely-linked global community of fiqh scholars
nevertheless remains the authoritative source of shari'a
knowledge for vast numbers of Muslims around the world. Thus,
even when a modern state claims to enact Islamic law, or strike
down secular legislation for shari'a-non-compliance, it does not
carry the same shari'a authority that fiqh scholars do with a large
percentage of their Muslim populations.
Keeping all this in mind, it does not seem that Feldman's
vision of a shari'a-enacting democratic legislature or a court's
shari'a-checking power of judicial review can fill the void left by
the fiqh scholars. Under the classical model described by
Feldman, state siyasa power was balanced by the non-state
power of the scholars and vice versa. But Feldman's proposal
separates only siyasa power, dividing it into three parts
(executive, legislative and judicial). In itself, this is not a bad
idea. Dividing unilateral (often dictatorial) state power into
separate entities such that no branch has a monopoly is certainly
a step forward in the evolution of siyasa organization. But
balancing the executive with a legislature is not the same thing as
diversity by appointing a variety of judges to adjudicate cases according to different
school doctrine. as needed by the population.
22. See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF
NATION BUILDING 35-42 (2004).
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balancing rulers with scholars. And assigning shari'a-checking
authority to a court cannot accomplish the same shari'a check on
government power as the fiqh scholars did because these
government branches would likely lack the shari'a-interpreting
credentials and credibility of independent fiqh scholars.
In addition, the idea of a legislature with the authority to
enact shari'a-compliant legislation can create some odd-and
ultimately counter-productive-concepts. For example. Feldman
and others posit that one positive potential of democratic bodies
enacting shari'a-based legislation is a "democratization of the
shari'a," 23 an idea which resonates with secular democrats as well
as many Muslim reform thinkers and Islamists who are generally
frustrated with traditional fiqh scholars claiming a monopoly
over shari'a interpretation. 24 But a promise to "democratize" the
shari'a will likely draw immediate resistance from anyone
understanding shari'a as God's Law, because it implies that
God's Law itself is subject to a human vote. Even more
fundamentally, "democratization of shari'a" is inaccurate as a
description of shari'a-based legislation itself. A legislature is,
after all, a siyasa institution. By giving it shari'a-enacting power,
all that has been accomplished is an "Islamization" of
government (siyasa) lawmaking, but it does not change the
content of shari'a itself, which still exists as ideal God's Law. Not
even the fiqh articulation of God's Law has been
"democratized" because, for vast numbers of Muslims, a fiqh
conclusion is legitimate as a possible articulation of shari'a only
if it is the result of independent jurisprudential analysis by a fiqh
scholar.

23. See (pp. 117-21 ). He describes this as a fundamental change in the theoretical
structure underlying Islamic law:
the shari·a is democratized in that its keeping is given over to a popularly
elected legislature charged with enacting legislation derived from the source
that is the shari·a. In practice. this democratization of the shari'a means that the
interpretation of what the shari'a requires is in the first instance put in the hands
of the public and its elected representatives. The problem of the missing
scholars who traditionally interpreted is addressed through the substitution of
the elected legislature for the scholars. Applied Islamic jurisprudence of the
kind once practiced by the scholars remains only insofar as it might be relevant
to a public that wants to draw upon Islamic legal reasoning to ascertain what
Islamic law requires. (p. 120)
24. For Feldman's description of the Islamist attitude toward traditionallv-trained
·
scholars. see pp. 105-17.
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CONCLUSION
Towards the end of The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.
Noah Feldman comments that a "new Islamic state, if it is to
succeed, can learn from aspects of traditional practice, but it
must do for itself the difficult and slow work of establishing new
institutions with their own ways of operating that will gradually
achieve legitimacy" (p. 149). This is an insightful comment. and
one that I hope his readership will take to heart. I believe. as
Feldman does, that every society is entitled to legal and political
institutions that reflect their own culture. values. heritage, and
aspirations. This premise is a central feature of this book. and
features prominently in much of Feldman's body of work to
25
date. In The Fall and Rise, he does an honorable job of bringing
legitimacy and respect to Islamically-motivated political
activism. This is not an easy task, given the heavy suspicion of
Islamism in current western minds. Yet Feldman is persistent.
These groups are not crazy religious zealots, he insists, but rather
a modern manifestation of a sincere and laudable desire for
justice. And their justice-seeking sentiment is rooted in a broadbased affinity for shari'a, which itself deserves respect as a rule
of law. He realizes that, for those working in the field of Islamic
law and constitutionalism, it is important to take seriously the
ideas of Islamist political parties, whether or not one agrees with
their overall platforms. 2" This is why Noah Feldman's work is
valuable paradigm-shifting material. He powerfully argues why
popular calls for recognition of religious law should be
addressed, not suppressed. His book offers American readers a
plausible way to take them seriously, and he suggests
alternatives to what is often the liberal impulse to find ways to
27
make the Islamic resurgence go away.
If Feldman succeeds in nothing more than bringing respect
to the word shari'a in American minds. he will have made a huge
and invaluable contribution. But his book has the potential to
25. See, e.g., FELDMAN. supra note 22: NOAH FELDMAJS. DIVIDED BY GOD:
AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM- AND WHAT WE SHOCLD DO ABOUT IT (2006 ):
NOAH FELDMAN. AITER JIHAD: AMERICA AISD THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLA\!IC
DEMOCRACY (2004).
26. He even ends his book with the bold recommendation that. "'[w]hen new legal
and constitutional institutions. Islamic or otherwise. do manage to enter onto the scene
and make their play for legitimacy. it is imperative to support them"' (p. 150).
27. As Feldman points out. "'[w]here Islamists win elections in a functioning state.
the United States and other regional actors are sufficiently nervous about Islamist
government that opponents-including those prepared to use force-will typically find
external support for undermining the Islamists in power .. (p. 1-l5).
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accomplish even more. If it can help shift American attitudes
about Islamic constitutionalism from dismissive condescension
of an oxymoron to respect for a legitimate-if complex-pursuit.
then Feldman's book can have a powerful paradigm-shifting
influence on global constitutional discourses. I offer the present
critique in the spirit of supporting this potential. Although I
disagree with the particular institutional scenarios Feldman
imagines for modern Islamic constitutionalism. I nevertheless
strongly appreciate his overall project. and the door that it opens
to more productive discussion and debate of this important
world topic. Feldman's approach displays optimism. not
suspicion. It looks in the direction of mutual respect and
engagement. which is the best long-term antidote to the violence
threatened by today's global religious-political conflicts. It is a
valuable work.

